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INTEFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS:
A SURVEY OF THE WISCONSIN LAW
INTRODUCTION
Man invariably gives serious consideration to obligations incurred
as a consequence of his entering into a contract. Less cognizance is
given to the responsibility to refrain from interfering with the con-
tractual relations of others. However, a person who intentionally
interferes with a contractual relation in a manner which destroys or
diminishes another's advantage in being a party to the relation may,
under some circumstances, incur liability for the resulting damage.'
The purpose of this article is to examine the Wisconsin decisions in
this area and attempt to determine the circumstances under which
liability will be imposed.
Cases concerning tortious interference with commercial relations
which are not based on existing contracts, but are merely prospective
or potential, while related to this study, are not considered here except
insofar as they contain issues in common with the principal subject.2
Cases involving interference with contractual relations by labor unions
are also not considered because of the special problems there involved.3
The article is further limited to a consideration of intentional inter-
ference with contracts of a pecuniary or commercial nature.
4
HISTORY
The rule that contractual relations are entitled to protection against
unreasonable interference has its probable origin in the fourteenth
century when, after the Black Death, the Ordinance of Labourers5 was
enacted to alleviate some of the problems resulting from the shortage
of laborers. That statute provided employers with a remedy against
persons who induced servants to leave their employ.-
One of the first cases extending the action established by the Ordi-
nance of Labourers to relations other than those of strict master and
1 See PROSSER, TORTS §106 (2d ed. 1955). In actions for intermeddling it is
not necessary that the party breaching the contract be made a party to the
action. E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 194 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833
(1927).
2 Id. §107. See also Annot. 99 A.L.R. 12 (1935) ; Annot. 9 A.L.R. 2d 228 (1950).
3 Unions can be held liable for interference with a contractual relationship
under state law. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1958). In many instances, however, state authority is
pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act, see Plumbers, etc. Local 298 v.
County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; Hehl v. Chippewa, etc. District Council, 4 Wis.
2d 629,91 N.W. 2d 226 (1958).
4 Excluded are contracts to marry or of marriage. See Annot. 47 A.L.R. 442
(1927); Annot. 73 A.L.R. 1452 (1931); Ableman v. Holman, 190 Wis. 112,
208 N.W. 889 (1926); Randall v. Lonstorf, 126 Wis. 147, 105 N.W. 663
(1905). Also excluded are cases involving negligent interference. See
PROSSER, supra note 1 at 732.
5 23 Edw. III, St. 1, 1349.
6 PROSSER, supra note 1 at 723.
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servant was decided by the Court of Queen's Bench in 1853.7 In that
case the defendant was held responsible for persuading an opera singer
to refuse to carry out her agreement to sing at the plaintiff's theatre.
The case is significant because the singer was clearly not a servant and
because the method of inducement was not itself tortious.1 The court
placed much emphasis upon the defendant's "malice."
In 1881 the earlier extension of the doctrine was reconsidered and
confirmed in Bowen v. Hall.9 Because the case involved a personal
servant contract, some doubt existed as to the type of contract to which
the tort was applicable even though the principle enunciated in the
opinion was stated so as to apply to all types of contracts. That doubt
was removed by the decision in Quinn v. Leathen,'° wherein that it was
said ". . . a violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause of
action, and . . . it is a violation of legal right to interfere with con-
tractual relations recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justifica-
tion for the interference."
The American courts were at first slow to recognize liability for
intentional interference in contractual relations. Some limited reco-
very to cases involving personal service contracts."' However, in 1893
the United States Supreme Court adopted the English law relating to
the tort of inducing a breach of a contract and extended it so as to im-
pose liability for acts rendering performance of a contract impossible.
12
Since that time the tort has gained widespread acceptance although
the cases indicate little unanimity in approach or reasoning."
The Wisconsin cases resolving claims of tortious interference with
contracts, even though few in number, have considered many issues.
The first case recognizing the doctrine, Martens v. Reilly,' 4 expressly
predicated liability upon a conspiracy theory even though the court
cited and quoted extensively from earlier American and English cases
which recognized interference as an independent tort. Recent Wiscon-
sin decisions have not discussed the conspiracy aspect,15 although the
frequent citation of the Martens case is strong indication that the law
of conspiracy there enunciated is still accepted. In fact it is suggested
that the right to recover from one who interferes with an enforceable
contract is based sub silentio upon the law of conspiracy.
1 6
7Lumley v. Gye, El. and BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 707
(1853).
s RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §766, comment b at 52 (1939).
9 6 Q.B.D. 333 (1881).
10 (1901) A.C. 495.
11 PROSSER, supra note 1 at 724.
12 Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul etc. Railway, 151 U.S. 1 (1893).
13See Annot. 26 A.L.R. 2d 1227 (1952).
14 109 Wis. 464, 84 N.W. 840 (1901).
15 E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N.W. 85 (1931), cert.
denied 285 U.S. 538 (1932).
16 See Bitzke v. Folger, 231 Wis. 513 at 523, 286 N.V. 36 (1939). The decision




A. Existence of the Contract
This article is limited to cases involving interference with a con-
tract. As has been noted, however, that liability may be incurred by
one who prevents another from entering into a contract, or in some
way interferes with a commercial relationship which is merely pro-
spective and not existent by contract.17 By definition a contract is a
prerequisite to an action based on interference with a contractual rela-
tionship. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that there be a breach of
that contract in order for the tort to arise. This is demonstrated by
those instances in which a cause of action has been recognized to exist
even though interference culminated in termination of the contract in
accordance with its terms.' s Further, even though no obligations exist
to be breached in the instance of an unenforceable contract, neverthe-
less some cases sustain the right of action for intermeddling with unen-
forceable contracts.
9
B. Interference with the Contract.
Interference with an existing contract relationship may occur in
the following ways: (1) deliberately soliciting a breach, (2) aiding or
participating in a breach, or (3) causing the termination of a contract
in accordance with its terms. Of course, it is possible that a person
may both solicit and participate in a breach. These methods of inter-
ference and the necessary conditions of liability under each will be
taken up seriatim.
(1) Deliberately Soliciting a Breach.
Northern Wisconsin Cooperative Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal20 is
illustrative of the factors requisite to charge one with liability for in-
ducing a breach of contract. In that case the plaintiff was granted an
injunction restraining the defendants from buying or attempting to buy
tobacco from persons who as members of the plaintiff-pool were under
contract to sell their tobacco crops to the plaintiff.
The defendants conceded that they would be liable if their inter-
ference with the marketing contracts was motivated by malice or if
methods were employed which were tortious in themselves. The de-
fendants contended, however, that in the interest of free trade and
competition one is allowed to purchase products offered to him in an
open market although the person offering such products may be under
contract to sell them to someone else. Without accepting or rejecting
that principle the court held it inapplicable because the interference by
Bekkedal was malicious. The court did not undertake to define or fix
'7 Supra note 2.
Is E.g. Johnson v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 56, 147 N.W. 32 (1914).





the limits of malicious interference but merely held it to be present
under the facts.
21
The defendants in the Bekkedal case defended by showing that
they had been in the tobacco business for 30 years and were seriously
harmed by the plaintiff's marketing contracts. The court, however,
noted that the defendants deliberately solicited persons known by them
to be under contract to the plaintiff to break those contracts. They
did this by telling the growers that the contracts were inoperative, that
the price offered by the plaintiff was too low, that they would pay
more and that they would indemnify and protect the growers against
any liability incurred toward the plaintiff.
Since the Bekkedals do not appear to have been motivated by
malice in the sense that they sought to inflict harm for its own sake
but rather sought to protect their own position in the Wisconsin tobac-
co market, and since the means utilized by the Bekkedals were not in
themselves tortious, it seems that any requirement that the interference
be malicious can be met by a mere showing of a deliberate solicitation
of a breach. Support for this conclusion is found in E. L. Husting Co.
v. Coca Cola Co." where it was ruled that liability was incurred by
one who persuades a party under contract that its business interests
would be better served by ceasing its contract relations and breaching
its contract by giving an exclusive contract to the persuader. In fur-
ther negating any requirement of actual ill will, the court said that
"... the definition of 'malice' has been broadened to include unjusti-
fied interference with the contractual relationship.
23
Where the interference occurs through deliberate solicitation and
where the parties to the contract prior to the solicitation treated the
contract as valid and subsisting, it does not seem necessary that the
contract be in fact enforceable. In Northern Wisconsin Cooperative
Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal the contracts which were the basis of the
21 Many courts have required that the interference be malicious. This requisite
is accurately described by the following language quoted in E. L. Husting Co.
v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N.W. 85 (1931) and Sweeney v. Stenjem,
271 Wis. 497, 74 N.W. 2d 174 (1956).
"The great weight of authority in this country and in England is to
the effect that if A. has a legal contract with B., either for the rendition
of service or any other purpose, and C., having knowledge of the existence
thereof, intentionally and knowingly, and without reasonable justification
or excuse, induces B. to break the contract, by reason of which A. sustains
damage, an action will lie by A. against C. to recover the same .... The
action of C. is malicious, in that, with the knowledge of A's rights, he
intentionally and knowingly, and for unworthy or selfish purposes, de-
stroys them by inducing B. to break his contract. It is a wrongful act,
done intentionally, without just cause or excuse, and from this a malicious
motive is to be inferred. This does not necessarily mean actual malice or
ill-will, but the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social
justification." Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 141 N.E. 914 (1923).
22 Supra note 15.
23 E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co., supra note 21, at 365.
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action provided that they would not be effective unless a specified
number of growers signed similar contracts by a certain date. The
defendants contended that the contracts never became operative be-
cause the condition was not met. The court refused to consider this
defense and said:
All parties acquiesced in the validity of the contracts. Under
such circumstances we are unable to perceive any legitimate
reason for permitting a mere intermeddler with relations thus
created to assert the right to challenge the validity of these con-
tracts. If the immediate parties saw fit to treat them as legal
contracts, defendants' interference with relations thereby cre-
ated is no less immoral because the grower members might have
had a legal defense thereto.2 4
Despite the clear language of the Bekkedal decision, it cannot be
positively stated that an enforceable contract it never a condition of
liability where the manner of interference is deliberate solicitation.
The court in the Husting case apparently deemed it necessary to de-
cide that the contract there in question was enforceable and devoted a
large portion of the decision to the question of whether or not a con-
tract right existed. A possible explanation is that the "malice" present
in the Husting case did not measure up to that in Northern Wisconsin
Cooperative Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal or, stated another way, that more
justification for the interference existed under the facts of the Husting
case. A better explanation is that in the Husting case not all the imme-
diate parties to the contract prior to the solicitation acquiesced in the
validity of the contract.2
5
"Where interference with a contract is motivated by actual malice
(in spite or ill will) the question of whether or not the contract is
enforceable between the parties should be immaterial. Causing the
termination of an employment at will is tortious if done with actual
malice even though no contract right to continued performance exists
in either the employer or the employee.26  Since a contract right
against the party induced to terminate the relationship is not necessary
in those situations no reason is perceived why it should be where a
breach of an unenforceable contract is solicited.
24 No. Wis. Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, supra note 19, at 584. The court,
however, did consider at length the defendants' contention that the plaintiff's
contracts with its members were in restraint of trade, thus indicating that
the illegality of the contract interfered with is a valid defense. See also
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Lang, 16 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925)
where a similar defense was considered.
25 It is reasonably certain that the Hwrting case, supra note 15, did not have
the effect of overruling the Bekkedal case, supra note 19. In Bitzke v. Folger,
szpra note 16, the court ruled that as long as a party to a contract was willing
and ready to continue performance, an intermeddler had no right to mali-
ciously procure that party to refuse performance of the contract even though
it did not comply with the Statute of Frauds.
26 See Bitzke v. Folger, supra note 16, at 523, 286 N.W. 36 (1939).
1959]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [o4
(2) Aiding or Participating in a Breach.
As was pointed out above, the first Wisconsin case recognizing
liability for tortious interference with a contract was based upon the
law of conspiracy.2 7 The plaintiffs in that case had a lease on real
property with an option giving them the first privilege to buy the
leased premises. The inter-meddling defendants induced the lessor
to breach the agreement by granting to them an option to purchase.
The intermeddlers then caused the plaintiffs to be served with a written
cancellation of their lease and notice to cease improving the property.
Liability was imposed on the defendants under the simple theory out-
lined by Justice Marshall in the syllabus as follows:
The violation of a contract is an unlawful act. Therefore, if
one or more persons conspire with another to commit, or two
or more persons combine together to effect, such violation, and
the object of the combination be consummated to the damage
of a third person, such third person has his action to recover
the damages against him who breached the contract and every
person who, by reason of the combination, is connected with the
wrong.
Even though the Martens case involved a deliberate solicitation of
a breach, the conspiracy theory there enunciated may cause liability
to be imposed on one who does not solicit but merely aids or partici-
pates in a breach. Purchasing goods from a vendor who is under con-
tract to sell the same goods to another is not generally considered
tortious where the purchase does not solicit the sale but merely makes
it economically feasible by his readiness to buy.29 However, if a pur-
chaser buys goods which he knows or should know are under a con-
tract of sale to another,30 the purchaser and the seller have combined
to effect the violation of that contract. It appears that under the theory
of the Martens case no actual malice is required but only a combination
to violate a contract and the resulting damage. 1
Since it is necessary that there be a combination to do an unlawful
act under the law of conspiracy set forth in the Martens case, it is
possible that the Wisconsin court may be slow to apply the rule of that
case in those instances in which there is in fact no enforceable con-
tract. In the decision the term "unlawful" was said to include all
willful, actionable violations of civil rights and, of course, a breach of
27 Martens v. Reilly, 109 Wis. 464, 84 N.W. 840 (1901).
28 Id. at 465.
29 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §766, comment i (1939). Accord, Caldwell v. Gem
Packing Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 80, 125 P. 2d 901 (1942) ; Lamport v. 4175 Broad-
way, 6 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. N.Y. 1934).
30 Knowledge of the contract appears necessary. PROSSER, TORTS §106 at 734 (2d
ed. 1955). However, constructive knowledge will suffice. Sweeney v. Stenjem,
271 Wis. 497, 74 N.W. 2d 174 (1956).
31 In a conspiracy action the gravamen of the charge is not the conspiracy but




an unenforceable contract or a termination of a relation which exists
only through the acquiescence of the parties to it is not an actionable
violation of a civil right by the party to the relationship. Although no
Wisconsin case has considered the problem it would be seen that, even
though one does not solicit a breach of a contract but instead accepts
an offer of the goods or services under contract to another, it is pos-
sible that the circumstances under which he accepts the goods or ser-
vices, and thereby aids in the breach of the contract, may cause a
court to view his act as "malicious" as that term was used in the
Bekkedal decision.3 2 If the acceptance of goods or services under con-
tract to another is in a given case as "malicious" or as unjustified as
the deliberate solicitation present in the Bekkedal case, it would seem
that a defense that the contract was unenforceable should fail as it did
there. Possibly the selfish intent to obtain the benefits of another's
bargain under the contract would preclude any defense based on the
unenforceability of the contract. 33
Although liability may be imposed without regard to the law of
conspiracy upon one who deliberately solicits a breach of a contract,
it is difficult to see how facts justifying recovery for damages re-
sulting from that method of interference can fail to constitute a con-
spiracy where the contract is enforceable.3 4 As the Martens case makes
clear a combination to effect a violation of a contract which results in
damage is an actionable conspiracy. One advantage, however, which
may be gained by the allegation and proof of a conspiracy is that the
intermeddler may be held liable for more damage than is actually
caused by him. Thus, it has been indicated that even though parties to
an option may have bound themselves beyond their right in the pro-
perty, those who acted in combination with them in breaching the
agreement were liable for all the resulting damage.35
(3) Causing the Termination of a Contract in Accordance with its
Terms.
The defendant in Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 36 attempted to
cause its insured, Simmons Manufacturing Company, to terminate the
employment of the plaintiff because he had filed a claim for personal
injuries against the insured. Johnson's right to continue working for
Simmons was held to be entitled to protection from unjustified inter-
ference by third parties even though he had no formal contract of ser-
vice and could quit or be fired at any time. The ruling is in accord
with the general rule that one who knowingly interferes with the
32 Supra note 19.
33 McLennan v. Church, 163 Wis. 411 at 419, 158 N.W. 73 (1916).
34 Contra, E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N.W. 85 (1931),
cert. denied 285 U.S. 538 (1932).
35 Martens v. Reilly, rupra note 27; in accord, Bitzke v. Folger, supra note 16.
36 158 Wis. 56, 147 N.W. 32 (1914).
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relationship of master and servant without just cause is liable for the
resulting damage even though there is no right of action against the
person who was induced to terminate the relation.3 1
The court in the Johnson case indicated that if the insurer was
justified in attempting to procure Johnson's discharge, the fact that it
acted with malice would not give rise to a cause of action. Malice
would simply allow the recovery of punitive damages if the defendant
acted without justification."8 However, it was held that the defendant
would not be justified in attempting to deprive the plaintiff of his earn-
ing power so that he could not maintain a suit against his employer
and that Johnson had made out a prima facie case.3 9 The decision,
consequently, seems to establish that an action will lie for interference
with a relationship terminable at will which interference is merely
unjustified and not prompted by ill will.
Only one other case in which the defendant caused the termination
of a contract in accordance with its terms has been found among the
Wisconsin decisions. 40 In that case the defendant who entertained
hostile feelings towards the plaintiff induced his tenants to discontinue
using the plaintiff's electrical current. It was conceded that the tenants
themselves might discontinue the use of the plaintiff's current on rea-
sonable notice. The court recognized that the plaintiff had legal right
to sell its current to those who desired it and that such a right was
entitled to legal protection. However, the court ruled that whatever
a man may lawfully do on his own property he may do regardless of
his motive.
Because of the paucity of Wisconsin precedent, doubt exists as to
what constitutes justification for interference with contracts which are
terminable at will or upon the giving of notice. It would be unreason-
able to impose liability upon one who, motivated by a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, offers a person an attractive salary and thereby induces
him to lawfully terminate a contract even where the offeror has no
knowledge of the relationship. Since the right to continue a contract
which has no definite term is clearly not absolute, it appears that there
must be some degree of actual malice or of improper methods before a
court could characterize interference with it as unjustified.
Several recent New York cases 41 have considered the problem and
3757 C.J.S. Master and Servant §625 b (1948).
38 The rule that actual malice does not make wrong that which is lawful now
seems to be rejected by most courts. See PROSSER, TORTS, §106 at 721 (2d ed.
1955). The Wisconsin court had declined to follow the rule prior to the
Johnson case. See State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 257-260, 85
N.W. 1046 (1901).
" Johnson failed to recover, however, because the defendants' acts were held
not causal.40 People's Land & Mfg. Co. v. Beyer, 161 Wis. 349, 154 N.W. 382 (1915).
41 American League Baseball Club v. Pasquel, 187 Misc. 230, 63 N.Y.S. 2d 537,
(1946); Coleman & Morris v. Pisciotta, 279 App. Div. 656, 107 N.Y.S. 2d
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that state seems to have evolved the rule that an inducement to an
employee at will to discontinue his employment is not actionable "un-
less the purpose of the actor was solely to produce damage, or unless
the means employed were dishonest or unfair." 42 The omission of the
word "solely" would bring this rule in line with the decision in the
Johnson case and probably cause it to be acceptable to the Wisconsin
court.
The Johnson and Beyer cases are the only Wisconsin cases which
have been found which directly consider the tort liability of one who
causes the termination of a contract in accordance with its terms.4 3 In
each case the plaintiff's right to continue to benefit from his contract
was held entitled to protection from unjustified interference. However,
the defendant in each case escaped liability. Consequently, the limits
of liability in this area have yet to be clearly defined in Wisconsin.
Even though the Wisconsin law recognizing the right to continue a
contractual relationship which has no definite term is not well settled,
it is reasonably certain that remedial responsibility may be imposed in
Wisconsin where an intermeddler persuades a party to the relationship
to discontinue it for the purpose of injurying the other party to the
relationship. This is so because of the Wisconsin law relating to con-
spiracies to injure.44 In Wisconsin two or more can be liable for doing
jointly what one person might legally do acting alone.45 Consequently,
if a party to the relationship which has no fixed term combines with
another for the purpose of injurying the other party to the relation-
ship and the relationship is terminated pursuant to the combination and
damage results, the terminating party may incur tort liability even
though no contract action would succeed against him. It seems, how-
715, (1951); Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y. 2d 369, 144 N.E. 2d 371
(1957); Taller & Cooper, Inc. v. Neptune Meter Co., 8 Misc. 107, 166 N.Y.S.
2d 693 (1957).
42 Coleman & Morris v. Pisciotta, id; Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., id; Taller &
Cooper, Inc. v. Neptune Meter Co., id.
43 In a third case the Wisconsin court indicated its approval of the general
rule imposing liability upon one who "maliciously and wantonly" procures
the termination of an employment at will. Bitzke v. Folger, 231 Wis. 513 at
523, 286 N.W. 36 (1939).
44 "Injury to business; restraint of will. Any 2 or more persons who shall com-
bine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert together for the pur-
pose of wilfully or maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade,
business or profession by any means whatever, or for the purpose of mali-
ciously compelling another to do or perform any act against his will, or
preventing or hindering another from doing or performing any lawful act
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year
or by fine not exceeding $500." Wis. Stat. §134.01 (1957). The statute has
been held declarative of the common law relating to civil actions for damages.
State ex rel. Durner v. Huegins, 110 Wis. 189, 85N.W. 1046 (1901); Hawarden
v. Youghiogheny & Lehigh Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
45 State ex rel. Durner v. Huegins, supra note 44; Hawarden v. Youghiogheny
& Lehigh Coal Co., supra note 44; State v. Lewis and Leidersdorf Co., 201
Wis. 543, 230 N.W. 692 (1930) ; Contra, Shannon v. Gaar, 233 Iowa 38, 6 N.W.
2d 304 (1942) ; see also Annot. 84 A.L.R. 99.
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ever, that the terminating party and the intermeddler who combines
with him must have the purpose of inflicting harm as an end in itself
and not to cause the termination as a means to some other end.46
DEFENSES
The Wisconsin law relating to defenses to the action for damages
resulting from interference with contractual relations appears to be
even less settled than that relating to the conditions of liability. Only
two Wisconsin cases directly considering tortious interference with
contractual relations have been found in which the defendants pre-
vailed. 47 Of course, the decisions in which the court imposed liability
do provide some indication of what will or will not constitute a de-
fense. As an example the decision in Northern Wisconsin Cooperative
Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal4 makes it fairly clear that Wisconsin fol-
lows the general rule that no liability may be imposed where the con-
tract which is the basis of the action is illegal.4 9 Other defenses will
be considered under the following headings: A. Lack of knowledge,
B. Causality, and C. Equal or Superior Right.
A. Lack of Knowledge
Lack of knowledge of the contract with which the intermeddler
interferes can constitute a defense.50 Thus, if one makes an offer to
purchase real estate without knowledge that the owner has contracted
to sell to another, no liability attaches to the second offeror by reason
of the owner's acceptance of his offer and breach of the first contract. 51
However, in Sweeney v. Stenjen52 the Wisconsin court held the
second offeror liable where he had knowledge which would put a pru-
dent man on inquiry and failed to use ordinary diligence in ascertain-
ing the plaintiff's interest. Stenjem was informed by the vendor and
his attorney that the contract with the plaintiff, which was conditional,
had been terminated. The court said that this information ". . . con-
stituted notice of the existence of such contract, and it was incumbent
upon him to make such inquiry as would apprise him of the true
facts." Hence, in Wisconsin when one is told that a contract is at an
end he has received constructive notice that it still exists.
In this area ignorance of the law is not a defense in Wisconsin. In
McLennan v. Church53 the plaintiff's contract to purchase the land of
the defendant, the Churches, was breached when the Churches sold it
46 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.W. 194 (1904).
47 People's Land & Mfg. Co. v. Beyer, supra note 40; Johnson v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., supra note 36.
48 182 Wis. 571, 197 N.W. 936 (1923).
49 See Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n., 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E. 2d 602 (1940); see
also Annot. 26 A.L.R. 2d 1242 (1952).
50 Supra note 30. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS, comment e (1939).
51 Stannard v. McCool, 198 Md. 609, 84 A. 2d 862 (1951).
52 271 Wis. 497, 74 N.W. 2d 174 (1956).
53 163 Wis. 411, 158 N.W. 73 (1916).
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to their co-defendant, Curby. The circuit court found that Curby pur-
chased in good faith without any intention of defrauding the plaintiff
and held him not liable for damages. The supreme court, in modify-
ing the judgment so as to make all defendants liable for damages,
stated that Curby knew the circumstances requisite to charge him with
knowledge that the contract had not lapsed. The court held that while
Curby's erroneous supposition that a default terminated the plaintiff's
contract rights might relieve him from any taint of moral turpitude,
nevertheless it did not relieve him of remedial responsibility.
B. Causality
Generally in order for liability to attach, the acts of the inter-
meddler must exert a causal effect and actually induce the breach.54
The Wisconsin court has followed this rule.5 5 However, as was
pointed out above, a person who obtains goods or services which he
knows are under contract to another cannot defend on the grounds that
he did not cause the breach where he aids or participates in the
breach.56 Where the party bound by the contract, prior to any solicita-
tion, effectively breaches the contract and places the goods or services
upon the open market, it seems that anyone may purchase them. Thus,
on the rehearing of Northern Wisconsin Cooperative Tobacco Pool v.
Bekkedal 5 7 the judgment affirming the injunction was modified so as
not to prohibit the intermeddler from buying tobacco from growers who
had contracted to sell only to the plaintiff after those growers "volun-
tarily" breached their contract and placed their tobacco on the market.
The defense that the intermeddler's acts were not causal would
seem to be a difficult one to establish because of the difficulty in prov-
ing the fact that the party to the contract reached its decision to breach
or terminate the contract independently. However, the testimony of
the one allegedly induced may be conclusive. The defendant in John-
son v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.-" sent a letter to a Simmons Manufacturing
Company official recommending that Johnson be fired. Mr. Simmons
testified that he knew nothing of the letter and ordered the discharge
for his own reasons. The official who received the letter testified that
he did the actual firing because of Mr. Simmons' order and not because
of the letter. This testimony was held to be conclusive on the issue of
causality and allowed the defendant to escape liability.
C. Equal or Superior Right.
One well recognized defense to the action for interference with a
contract is that the interference occurred only through "the exercise
54 PROSSER, TORTS, §106 at 728 (2d ed. 1955).
55 Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 36.
56 See discussion of Interference with the Contract, (2) Aiding or Participating
in a Breach, infra.
5 Supra note 48.
58 Supra note 36.
1959]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of an equal or superior right."59 The defense was recognized but not
found present under the facts in Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. where
the court indicated that the defendant insurance company might have
the right to refuse to assume the added hazard that would be liable to
follow from the employment of a careless worker but did not have the
right to prompt the limiting of a worker's earning power so as to pre-
vent his maintaining a damage suit. The defense was successful in
Peoples Land and Mfg. Co. v. Beyer.60 The court in that case, while
holding that the plaintiff had the legal right to sell its electrical current
to those who desired it, held that the defendant land owner had the
equal or superior right to use his property as he chose and to insist that
his tenants discontinue using the plaintiff's electricity.
Although no Wisconsin case has discussed the point, it should be
noted that an equal or superior right should be more easily found in
the defendant where the plaintiff's contract is unenforceable or subject
to termination at will or upon notice. Generally, the fact that the inter-
meddler is engaged in an industry similar to the plaintiff's and inter-
fered only in order to further his own interests does not give him an
equal or superior right where the plaintiff's right is based upon an
enforceable contract.61 The Bekkedal case62 indicates that the protec-
tion of the defendant's business interests will not constitute a defense
in Wisconsin for interference by deliberate solicitation even though the
plaintiff's contract may not be enforceable. However, where the plain-
tiff's right to continued performance of a contract is subject to termi-
nation at will or upon notice, it might well be that the defendant has
the equal or superior right to protect his business by inducing a termi-
nation of the plaintiff's contracts.
Closely related to the defense that the interference occurrea only
through the exercise of an equal or superior right is th defense based
upon the intermeddler's privilege to render advice. No Wisconsin case
has been found in which the privilege was recognized other than the
Bekkedal decision wherein the court in passing recognized that one
acting in good faith may advise another to breach a contract without
incurring liability.6 3 Generally the privilege seems to be limited to
honest advice within the scope of a request for advice,6 4 except where
the person giving the advice is charged with the welfare of the person
he advises. In such a case the privilege extends to unsolicited advice
and even persuasion but it is necessary that the person giving the ad-
5 See Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 763,
wherein the phrase "equal or superior interests" is thoroughly discussed.
60 Supra note 40.
61 See Annot. 26 A.L.R. 2d 1265 (1952).
62 Supra note 48.
63 Id., 182 Wis. at 581.
64 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, §772 (1939).
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vice have the purpose of protecting the welfare of the person whom he
advises.6 5
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to accurately and concisely state the Wisconsin law
relating to interference with contract relations. This is so because of
the small number of cases and because each case, to a large extent, has
been decided upon the basis of its own facts. It seems, however, that
the following general statements may be made:
(a) One who without justification solicits another to breach a con-
tract with a third person is liable to that third person for the resulting
damage. It is not necessary that the solicitation be motivated by ill
will or actual malice. The solicitation may be justified if the contract
is illegal, if the actor has no knowledge of the contract or if he acts in
the exercise of an equal or superior right but it is not justified merely
by reason that the contract is not enforceable. 66
(b) One who interferes with a contract relation and who is moti-
vated by actual malice or uses illegal means is liable to the party
harmed even though no contract action is possible against the other
party to the relation, except where the actor acts in the exercise of a
legal right of an absolute nature, such as exercise of control over one's
own property.
(c) One who aids or participates in the breach of a contract is
liable to the party harmed if the contract is enforceable and the actor
has knowledge of it. The actor may be liable even where the contract
is not enforceable if his purpose was to produce damage or if the
means employed were dishonest. These latter conditions allow lia-
bility to be imposed on one who induces a party to terminate a contract
in accordance with its terms.
CHARLES Q. KAmps
65 Id., §770.
6 6 No Wisconsin case has been found in which the solicitation of a breach of a
contract was held justified.
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